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Abstract: A few studies have focussed on the relationship between the top management team and probability of firm default. 
This research aims to evaluate the effect of CEO and CFO attributes, as top management, on the firm's probability of default.  
The research adopts a quantitative research methodology, of 642 companies on the FTSE all Share index. The findings show 
that as remuneration and tenure increased the probability of default decreased. This research proposes a regression model 
that ascertains the causal effect of an increase in the tenure and compensation of the Top Management Team on the 
Probability of default of a firm over a 3-year period. 
The findings will have a direct implication on management tenure and remuneration for firms to reduce their probability of 
default. This research can be developed further by undertaking a time series analysis of the data to see how the changes over 
time would affect the relationships. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis proved to be a difficult trigger point 
for many companies and eventually played a big role in the 
collapse of many. The landscape of the UK high-street retailers 
has been continuously changing with each year providing a 
further challenge to these companies. One can argue that the 
companies that kept afloat within this difficult environment 
was as a result of strong management skills and management 
decisions relating to various aspects of the business before and 
during the crisis.  
There have been various studies investigating different 
management attributes and their relationship with the 
performance of a firm. However, only a few studies have 
focussed on the relationship between the top management team 
and probability of firm default. A majority of the focus within 
the top management team has been on the CEO and Chairman 
with few studies focusing on the role of the CFO. This 
research aims to evaluate the effect of CEO and CFO 
attributes, as top management, on the firm's probability of 
default. A similar research within the UK environment has not 
been undertaken before highlighting the gap within the 
literature this research aims to address. 
This study uses the Merton's Distance to Default (1974) model 
to measure the probability of default of firms. The study will 
then aim to measure the correlation between the management 
(CEO and CFO) tenure, compensation and the default 
probability of the firm (as measured by Bloomberg 3Year 
default probability).The Bloomberg probabilities of default are 
calculated based on the principles of the KMV model along 
with some further factors.  
Tenure and compensation for the purpose of the study is the 
sum of the individual tenures and compensation of the CEO 
and CFO. This was primarily done to reduce collinearity 
within the regression model as the tenure and compensation 
between the CEO and CFO showed a significant positive 
correlation.  
In practice the relevance of the study is of importance to 
corporate stakeholders especially shareholders, managers and 
regulators. It provides some evidence on any particular 
management team attributes that would support a firm 
undergoing financial distress or on the other end of the 
spectrum provide evidence to support that there is no 
relationship between a financially distressed firm's 
performance and management attributes. This would then 
provide motivation for further research to explore what other 
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operational attributes could have an impact on a financially 
distressed firm. 
2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research is to identify if there is a relationship 
between the joint tenure of the TMT and the probability of 
default. 
The specific objectives are: 
• To identify the relationship between the joint tenure of the 
Top Management Team and the firm’s probability of 
default 
• To identify the relationship between the joint 
compensation of the Top Management Team and the 
firm’s probability of default 
• To provide a regression model to explain the relationship 
between the variables and the default probability 
• To identify other top management team variables that 
have a significant impact on the probability of default 
3. RESEARCH GAP 
There is very little research focusing on the impact of the Top 
Management Team on the probability of default. The research 
that has been undertaken mostly focuses on the CEO and 
Chairman as the top management team, however this research 
pursues the top management team as the CEO and CFO. In 
addition, a similar research for UK companies has not been 
undertaken before.  
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been various studies investigating different 
management attributes and their relationship with the 
performance of a firm, such as the negative relationship 
between the probability of management turnover with firm 
performance and with stock returns (Warner et al., 1988; 
Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Kim, 1996 and Weisbach, 
1988).  
Vo and Phan (2013), a Vietnamese study, found that female 
board members, duality of CEO (boards chairman also the 
CEO), boards working experience and boards compensation all 
have a positive correlation with a firm’s 
performance.However, Clarke, Lindorff and Johnson (2013), 
an Australian study, found no relationship between the 
education qualification of the CEO and the firm's performance. 
There is little research on the relationship between 
management attributes and firm default risk. Significant 
accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have 
brought firm default risk in to more public light. The few 
studies linking top management attribute and financial distress 
showed some interesting results. Kallunki and Pyykko (2012), 
a Finnish study, found that CEO's and Directors past personal 
default entries increased the likelihood of the future financial 
distress of the firm.It was also further noted by Galloway and 
Jones (2006) that firms in financial distress usually did not 
prepare at all for top management succession.  
Memba and Nyanumbajob (2013) identified the following causes of Financial Distress in their study: 
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The top seven (Most Significant) causes could easily be related to management decisions showing the strong relationship between 
financial distress and the top management of a firm.  
Memba and Nyanumbajob (2013) further identified the effects of Financial Distress as follows: 
 
This shows an important impact of financial distress and at the top of the list is Management turnover/Management replacement. 
This strongly suggests that the responsibility and impact of financial distress lies with the top management team. This indicates 
that top management team should help a financially distressed firm perform better (relative to other financially distressed firm). 
Memba and Nyanumba Job (2013) also identified the following endogenous and exogenous variables as a conceptual framework 
for their study: 
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Research showed that firms facing financial distress not only 
had a higher probably of management turnover but there is 
improvement in the firm’s performance after a change in the 
top management which in turn increases value. This was 
supported by the findings of Denis and Denis (1995) and 
Huson et al. (2004) who found substantial improvement in 
firm performance after the top management were replaced 
following poor firm performance.Assessing performance with 
the probability of default or default risk, Ting (2011)found that 
the risk of default was higher prior to top management 
turnover and lower than other firms after the replacement. 
There is also research associating management turnover, fraud 
and probability of default. Sun and Zhang (2006) found that 
firms associated with fraud have higher management turnover 
than a matched sample of non-fraud firms. This could be down 
to managers of firms facing financial distress are likely to 
undertake accounting misrepresentation to show the firm in 
better light.A study of financially distressed firms showed that 
majority of the firms with top management turnover were 
either in default on debt or declared bankrupt. (Gilson. 1989; 
Ofek, 1993; and Gilson, 1989). 
A majority of these studies only focus on financially 
distressed, bankrupt or fraudulent firms.For stakeholders it is 
more important to be able to accurately predict the probability 
of non financially distressed, bankrupt or fraudulent firm to 
default.And although there are well established measures for 
the measurement of the default its relationship with the top 
management team is not clear. This research focuses on not 
just financially distressed or bankrupt or fraudulent firms but 
all firms listed on the FTSE All Share Index. 
Another unique focus of this study is that of the role of the 
CFO and the impact of the attributes of this role on the firm’s 
probability of default. This research uses default probabilities 
predicted by the KMV model developed from the Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1984) option pricing model. 
Agrawal, Goldie and Huyett (2013) highlighted how the role 
of the CFO has changed over the years and has moved beyond 
the core responsibilities. Many CFOs play a stronger role in 
corporate portfolio management and capital allocation while 
others play an important role as representatives of the company 
to investors and to the board, as leaders in performance 
management, and as exporters of finance-experienced 
personnel to the rest of the organization. The CFO is integral 
to all decisions that feed into the various indicators that help 
predict the probability of the firm default (examples: capital 
structure, sources of finance, pricing of securities, investments 
etc.) 
The “CFO typically oversees the firm’s financial reporting 
process and therefore he ⁄she likely has the most direct impact 
of all the senior managers on the accounting related decisions 
of the firm, such as choosing accounting methods and making 
accounting adjustments” (Mian 2001; Geiger and North 2006; 
Gore, Matsunaga, and Yeung 2008). This provides a strong 
argument to analyse the impact of the CFO attributes of 
financial distress as their growing role has direct relevance to 
the performance of the firm.  
The following Hypothesis is predicted: 
H1: A negative relationship exists between firms default risk 
and Top Management Team joint tenure 
H2: A negative relationship exists between firms default risk 
and Top Management Team joint compensation 
5. METHODOLOGY 
The research adopts a quantitative research methodology 
commencing with a Univariate analysis of the key variables, 
followed by a bivariate analysis, which feeds, into a regression 
model to undertake a multivariate analysis. Data on 
probabilities of default as computed by Bloomberg 
probabilities of default (developed from the KMV model) for 9 
months, 1 Year, 2 Year, 3 Year, 4 Year and 5 Year were 
collected. The probabilities show the likelihood of default of 
the company of the different periods of time. Compensation 
and Tenure of the CEO and CFO for 642 companies for the 
FTSE All Share Index was collected as on 18th August 2015. 
The sum of each variable was then taken as a joint Tenure and 
joint Compensation of the CEO and CFO. In addition, data on 
the companies ROA was collected to provide validity to the 
data. Vasiliou et al. (2003) found that firms with higher 
profitability ratios tend to amass less debt than firms that do 
not generate high profits and they also found that firms with 
higher debt have a higher probability of default. Therefore, 
similar results on the ROA will help provide validity to the 
findings of this research.  
6. FINDINGS 
The following regression model is proposed for this study: 
,,3./012345 =  65 + 898:;<=5 + 89840%25+ '>?5 + @5 
This model ascertains the causal effect of an increase in the 
tenure and compensation of the Top Management Team on the 
Probability of default of a firm over a 3-year period. The 
findings of the regression model show a highly significant 
causal relationship. The correlation matrix shows a significant 
negative correlation between the 3 Year probability of default 
and the joint compensation of the CEO and CFO. The matrix 
also shows significant negative correlation between the 3 Year 
probability of default and the joint tenure of the CEO and 
CFO.  
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The above findings are validated by the results of the 
significant negative correlation achieved between the ROA and 
the 3 Year probability of default. This result is in agreement 
with findings of earlier research as highlighted above. 
Some other interesting findings were achieved as a result of 
the additional variables focused on. There was a significant 
negative correlation between Bloomberg 9 month, 1 Year 
probability of default and the compensation of the top 
management team. There is also a significant negative 
relationship between Bloomberg 2 Year, 3 Year, 4 Year, 5 
Year probability of default and top management team Tenure 
& Compensation 
Both T-test and ANOVA show a significant association 
between Bloomberg 9 Month, 1 Year, 2 Year, 3 Year, 4 Year, 
5 Year default probability and CEO Promoted Within the 
Company. The findings showed that the companies where the 
CEO was promoted from within the company had an overall 
lower probability of default compared to where this was not 
the case.  
The Mann-Whitney U Test rejected the null hypothesis for the 
association between Bloomberg 6 Month, 9 Month, 1 Year, 2 
Year, 3 Year, 4 Year, 5 Year and the CEO on the board and 
former CEO on board. This shows that there is a significant 
relationship between the probability of default and the 
presence of the current CEO and former CEO on the board. 
The interesting finding here was that firms where the former 
CEO was on the board on an average had a lower probability 
of default which is interesting as this is not in agreement with 
good corporate governance practice.  
This could possibly be explained by the experience/knowledge 
of the former CEO adds value to the firm. It could also act as a 
monitoring/support mechanism for the new CEO and help 
maintain the performance of the firm. However, this could also 
be due to firms facing financial distress usually replace their 
top management team and therefore if the CEO has voluntarily 
completed the term and serving on the board then the firm is 
not in financial distress. This finding does require some further 
research to identify the precise reasons behind it as this will 
help future governance best practice. 
Hence, we accept both Hypothesis 1 and 2 as true i.e. a 
negative relationship exists between firms default risk and Top 
Management Team joint tenure; and a negative relationship 
exists between firms default risk and Top Management Team 
joint compensation 
7. LIMITATIONS/SCOPE FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
There are some specific limitation of this research which can 
be overcome by further research. Firstly, the research analyses 
data from a point in time, however stronger results will be 
achieved undertaking a longitudinal study. Some further 
variables such as Chairman (Compensation/Tenure) and other 
governance variables representing the Top Management Team 
can be considered. A doctoral study is currently being 
undertaken to pursue the broad topic of this study and these 
limitations will be overcome in the research. 
8. CONCLUSION (300 WORDS) 
This research provides both academics and practitioners with a 
different perspective of the top management team and their 
effect on a firm’s probability of default. The findings should 
help develop discussions for policy makers around governance 
issues, more specifically the term and remuneration. The 
findings show a significant negative relationship between the 
joint compensation and tenure of the Top Management Team 
(CEO/CFO) and the firm’s probability of default. This has 
some significant implications as governance and firms try to 
reduce terms of individuals in a role and as there is further 
public scrutiny over executive remunerations. 
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